Breaking intel shared exclusively with UncoverDC reveals that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) views employees at Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS)—a facility at the core of nuclear security in the United States—who have not been injected with a COVID-19 "vaccine" to be "Insider Threats." According to those with intimate knowledge of the situation, the order to label the unvaccinated as hostile agents comes straight from the DOE's Director of Office Safeguards, Security and Emergency Services (OSSES) for the agency's Savannah River Operations Office (SR) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, SC. The Director (DOE-SR, Director of OSSES), whose name has intentionally been omitted from this report, cautioned of potential "off-normal" activity from these employees, warning:
"We must keep a very close eye on these nonvaccinated employees. They are very, very angry. If they do anything off normal you are to immediately report them to the Local Insider Threat Working Group (LITWG)."
Reports suggest that for some time, unvaccinated workers at SRNS (which lists Honeywell International Inc., Newport News Nuclear Inc., and Fluor Corp. as parent companies) have been negatively portrayed as an 'insider threat.' According to information shared with UncoverDC, in at least three meetings with SRNS management, leaders at the site marked and labeled those not jabbed with a COVID-19 "vaccine" as 'saboteurs and spies' for rejecting the shot. Indeed, those questioning the necessity and legal authority of the company's vaccination demands fear the stigma of being branded a hostile agent will follow them for the rest of their lives and will "surface in any future security clearance investigation, or any routine law enforcement background investigation." Besides shattering their careers, the unique trust and confidence consistently held by SRS employees, specifically the unvaccinated who support the DOE's Nuclear Weapons Program, have been "forever destroyed."
According to persons with knowledge of the situation, the first two meetings where leadership mentioned the LITWG stance took place during the week of Sept. 27 - 30. Attended by top personnel, the routine 0615 early morning meetings were held via Teams. The third meeting transpired on Wed., Oct. 6, 2021, in preparation for a DOE audit and during a "telework Self-Assessment" review in Teams. The LITWG narrative delivered that day came from SRNS's Manager of Information and Personnel Security, who personally received the directive the preceding day from the DOE-SR, Director of OSSES.
Insider information reveals that the Director of SRNS's Infectious Disease Response Team (IDRT) stated under oath that the company's vaccine mandate was implemented under the direction of the DOE, not as a public safety precaution. Accordingly, the justification of "public safety" being behind the demand is deceitful. Those with knowledge insist SRNS is on record—both in submitted documents and sworn testimony in federal court—stating they implemented the vaccine mandate to placate the DOE (not for public safety). With no analysis prepared to evaluate the potential effects of the mandate, this admission destroys the site's entire Corrective Action Program (CAP) process, which outlines the following steps:
- Define the Problem
- Establish an Investigation Team
- Select an Interim Containment Action
- Verify the Interim Containment Action
- Identify the Root-Cause
- Complete a Comparative Analysis
- Develop Root-cause Theories
- Verify the Root-Cause
- Determine and Verify the Escape Point
- Implement & Validate Permanent Corrective Actions
Without question, the operations at SRS are crucial to national security. As long as the U.S. maintains a nuclear deterrent, the need for tritium—a byproduct in nuclear reactors and produced during nuclear weapons explosions—exists. SRS is the nation's only resource for supplying and processing this radioactive form of hydrogen. Alarmingly, insiders fear the unprecedented distinction of tagging unvaccinated employees as an "insider threat" does nothing but facilitate Nuclear Security concerns.
Moreover, under orders from the DOE-SR Site Manager, unvaccinated employees cannot travel to or attend necessary and ongoing National Training Center (NTC) training. With programs at SRS operating well above the Sensitive Compartmented Information (Q-SCI) level, this shortsightedness puts a halt to essential evaluations on personnel security supporting Special Access Program (SAP) authorization. Critical employees believe these actions "open the door to some horrible future insider actions, potentially impacting the U.S. national security at the very highest levels, and causing not just grave damage, but irreparable harm."
Consequently, the question persists, "How many interruptions in the NTC training cycle does it take before critical shortfalls begin to surface in the Protective Force (PF) operations and in the SRNS Safeguards and Security abilities?" The resounding answer from concerned team members is "not many." They explain:
"There are only a handful of professionals in the entire country certified to perform Vulnerability Assessments (VAs), pathway analysis, or conduct computer combat simulations to ascertain critical security weaknesses at a facility. There are even fewer who are capable of supporting Technical Security. There are even fewer Technical Security personnel than there are Physical Security personnel. They are rare beyond belief. And now SRNS has none."
